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Chatfield: Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Corporation Commissio

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE
OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION:
TENNECO OIL CO. v. EL PASO
NATURAL GAS CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. ,' the Oklahoma

Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has
subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute arising from a forced pooling

order of oil and gas interests.' The court also held that while the district court generally has the exclusive power to settle private contract
disputes, it may not deal with private contract arrangements which at-

tempt to supersede and modify the terms of a pooling order?
The Tenneco decision indicates a somewhat new approach to de-

termining the jurisdictional reach of the Corporation Commission.
While previous decisions have vacillated on the extent of the Commis-

sion's adjudicatory powers under oil and gas conservation legislation,4
the Tenneco decision accomplishes little in clarifying these adjudica1. 53 OKLA. B.J. 2476 (Oct. 19, 1982). At the time of this writing, a possible rehearing of the
Tenneco decision is pending.
2. Id at 2482. Oklahoma's forced pooling law is located at OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e)
(Supp. 1983). The law provides that where there are either separately owned tracts or undivided
interests in an established oil or gas spacing unit, and only one owner wishes to develop the oil or
gas, the tracts can be force pooled to allow development as a unit. Id; see Nesbitt, A Primer on
ForcedPooling of Oil and Gas Interests in Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. B.J. 648 (1979). The purpose of
pooling is to prevent the physical and economic waste that accompanies the drilling of unnecessary wells and to protect the correlative rights of landowners over an oil and gas reservoir. 6 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 901, at 3 (1983). A pooling order specifies the time
within which a non-consenting owner must elect to financially participate in the proposed well by
paying his proportionate share of the cost of the well, and thereby receiving a proportionate share
of the working interest; or, in the alternative, the mineral owner may elect to receive a bonus
payment in lieu of the right to participate in the working interest. Nesbitt, supra, at 649.
3. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482. In Tenneco, the dispute involved a contested election under a
Commission pooling order. Tenneco Oil Company contended that it communicated to El Paso
Natural Gas Company its election to participate in the well within the 15 day period specified in
the pooling order. Id at 2476. Tenneco argued in the alternative that it executed ajoint operating
agreement with El Paso that allowed Tenneco to participate in the well even if Tenneco did not
elect to do so under the pooling order. Id An explanation of operating agreements may be found
in Nesbitt, supra note 2, at 652.
4. Compare Southern Union Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1970)
(holding that Corporation Commission could not interpret its order's effect on pooling interests)
with Cabot Carbon Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 287 P.2d 675 (Okla. 1955) (holding that Corporation Commission could issue an order interpreting its previous orders which had set gas prices).
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tory powers. The court based its decision on an interpretation of public
rights,5 yet this decision and other recent Oklahoma Supreme Court
decisions concerning the Commission's jurisdiction have alluded to the
possible applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.6 The public rights doctrine concerns the adjudicatory powers of an agency derived from constitutional delegation,7 while primary jurisdiction
concerns judicial deference when a court feels a dispute should be handled by an administrative agency.' By rationalizing its decision on an
interpretation of public rights, the Tenneco court utilized a complex
and difficult method for ascertaining an agency's jurisdiction.
This Recent Development will attempt to clarify the reasoning of
the Tenneco opinion and to define the jurisdictional reach of the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission. It will also offer a critical analysis of the court's reasoning and will suggest an alternative means the
court could have used to reach its decision.
II.

TENNECO OIL Co.

v

EL .PASONATURAL

GAS Co.

A. Statement of the Case
Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. was initiated in the

District Court of Roger Mills County, Oklahoma, to quiet title to a
portion of an oil and gas leasehold estate. The dispute arose out of a
forced pooling order entered by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission 9 which conferred provisional operator status upon Tenneco condi5. See Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482. The court said, "In matters created by the Legislature and assigned to the Commission's adjudicative authority, the lines of demarcation between
the district court and the Commission must be drawn along the public-law/private-law borderline." Id. (emphasis in text).
6. In Tenneco, the court cited Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1979), for the proposition
that the Corporation Commission retains primary jurisdiction in cost-overrun disputes arising
under pooling orders. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2483 n.17; see Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215, 218 (Okla. 1980).
7. The public rights concept was early recognized by the federal courts as directing agency
adjudications of issues "which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932);seeinfra notes 16-42 and accompanying
text (general discussion of public rights concept).
8. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is invoked whenever the enforcement of a claim,
which is originally cognizable in the courts, requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. See 2
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 562-72 (1965); see also infra notes 43-75 and accompanying text (general discussion of doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
9. In most states the administration of the regulation of oil and gas is delegated to some
administrative body. In Oklahoma, the administration has been delegated to the Corporation
Commission, which also exercises authority in other areas. See OKLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 18. The
Commission was created by Oklahoma's constitution. Id art. IX, §§ 15-18. The Corporation
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tioned on the commencement of operations within ninety days. If

Tenneco failed to commence operations within the specified period, El
Paso would become the unit operator. In that event, Tenneco would
have fifteen days to elect to participate in the drilling of the proposed

well or to accept a cash bonus and royalty interest in lieu of participation. The pooling order did not specify how this election was to be

communicated to El Paso and this ambiguity gave rise to the controversy. Tenneco contended that it did communicate to El Paso its inten-

tion to participate in the well, while El Paso contended there was a

failure by Tenneco to elect to participate.' 0
Another dispute in the case concerned a joint operating agreement
that Tenneco contended was executed by the parties." Tenneco argued that this agreement allowed it to participate in the costs and pro-

ceeds of the well whether or not there was a valid election. The trial
court, finding both a properly communicated election and a valid oper-

ating agreement, quieted title in favor of Tenneco. When El Paso appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, that court raised the issue of

first time and held the trial court lacked jurisdiction
jurisdiction for the
2
over the issues.'

B. Rationale of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The court based its decision on a public rights rationale. It stated

that the election issue arose solely in the area of public law and that
pooling orders are statutory creatures, unknown at common law, and
created in the public interest.1 3 Therefore, disputes arising over the
Commission is defined as having legislative, executive, and judicial powers and is both an administrative board and a judicial tribunal. Id art. IX, §§ 18-19; see DeBois, Practice and Procedure
Before the CorporationCommission a/the State of Oklahoma, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1954). It
is vested with the authority of a court of record within its jurisdiction and with the power to
enforce compliance with its orders. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 19; see Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 230 (1932) (Corporation Commission is a court of record when
proceeding upon matters in which jurisdiction has been vested in the Commission by statute).
10. Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2476.
11. Id An operating agreement is a contract which usually specifies how the costs of the well
and the proceeds from the well will be distributed among those participating in production.
It is common practice for the operator to accept the written election to participate
followed by execution of an operating agreement as satisfactory security, especially
where the parties have engaged in joint operations before, or the pooled owner is a substantial operator of established reputation. In other cases, the operator will accept security in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit or an escrow deposit.
Nesbitt, supra note 2, at 652.
12. Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482.
13. Id. at 2481. The court said that although elections are not specifically provided for by
statute, they are among the terms of pooling orders, and pooling orders are provided for by statute. Id.
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terms of a pooling order are within the jurisdiction of the agency assigned to issue them, the Corporation Commission. The court said that
"[i]n matters created by the Legislature and assigned to the Commission's adjudicative authority, the lines of demarcation between the district court and the Commission must be drawn along the publiclaw/private-law borderline."' 4 The Commission has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate differences between private individuals in litigation involving "purely" private interests. On the other hand, the court explained,
when the core of the dispute is a claim fashioned by the state in the
public interest, the disposition of the issues lies with the Commission.'"
By relying on a distinction between public and private rights, the court
exposed the confusion which has plagued administrative law.
III.

METHODS OF DELIMITING JURISDICTION

A. Public Rights
In the use of the administrative process as a tool of government an
inherent tension exists between public interest and private rights. The
legislative body, in determining policy and standards, delegates to administrative agencies the task of translating standards into regulations.
However, as an agency carries out this legislative mandate, a question
arises as to how closely the administrative process should consider the
private interests that may become involved. It is unlikely that the public and private interests will ever be equally balanced; rather, it may be
more likely that the administrative process will have an onerous effect
on the private rights of individuals. It is often difficult to determine
when an agency has impermissibly encroached upon the area of private
rights.
The public rights doctrine advances the policy that Congress may
create public rights and place their regulation and enforcement in public bodies or agencies set apart from the private law process. In federal
law the public rights doctrine extends to those cases "which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments."' 6 Thus, congressionally created
rights and the claims which arise from them may be assigned to agencies for regulation and adjudication. The public rights doctrine also
14. Id. at 2482.
15. Id.
16. CroweU v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
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implies the ability to separate those matters which should be subject to

agency discretion and those which should not. However, the distinction between those matters inherently judicial and those matters created and set apart from the private law process is often difficult to

discern.
The United States Supreme Court first formulated the public
rights concept in the seminal case of Murray'sLessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co. ,7 in which the Court stated that "there are matters,

involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible
of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts."' 8 The public rights concept recognizes a historical distinction between matters that can be determined

conclusively by the executive and legislative branches of government

and matters that are necessarily judicial.' 9 It draws upon the principle

of separation of powers and an understanding that certain prerogatives
are reserved to the political branches of government.

The degree of power that may be allocated to administrative agencies by the legislature, however, is questionable. The Supreme Court
has said that the mode of determining which matters are reserved to the

legislative branch is completely within congressional control.2" "Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power

to executive officers, or may commit it to the judicial tribunals."21
17. 59 U.S. 272 (1855). The issue in this case was whether Treasury officials could audit
accounts of customs officials. The auditing was judicial in nature, and thus, it was argued, could
only be performed by article III judges. Id at 275. The Court held that article III of the Constitution presented no bar to this exercise of Congress' taxing power because it was a public law controversy which did not require resolution in a court. Id at 284-85. The Court held that disputes
between citizens and the federal government, as opposed to suits between private parties, could be
assigned to legislative courts. Id
18. Id. at 284.
19. In Murray's Lessee the Court examined the law of England as it was brought to the
United States to determine whether the issue presented was traditionally cognizable in the courts.
Id at 277-78. The Court found that where the matter was not one traditionally reserved for
judicial determination, there was no bar to Congress' establishment of procedures outside of article III courts. Id at 283-85. A controversy where the government is a party enforcing its constitutionally derived powers, such as tax collection, is an example of a matter not reserved for judicial
determination. Id. at 280-81. InExparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), the Court held that
the Court of Customs Appeals had been properly constituted by Congress as a legislative tribunal.
"The appeals include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination, but
only matters the determination of which may be, and at times has been, committed exclusively to
executive officers." Id. at 458.
20. Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
21. Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has set out some examples of this congressional delegation of power. "Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power
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Thus, Congress may establish legislative courts that examine and determine various matters arising between the government and others that
do not necessarily require judicial determination.22 When Congress
creates new statutory public rights it may assign their adjudication to
an administrative agency.23 By creating and setting these public rights
and remedies apart from the private law process, Congress may commit
their enforcement to a special tribunal other than a judicial court.24
Suits 5brought to such agencies are proceedings unknown at common
2
law.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has never definitively
resolved the distinction between public and private rights, nor has it
resolved the extent to which Congress may create tribunals to resolve
issues falling within the subject matter jurisdiction of article III of the
26
Constitution.

The Court has indicated in some recent cases that Con-

as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the
facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
51 (1932) (footnote omitted).
22. See Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
23. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
24. Id. at 450. The Court defined cases in which "public rights" are being litigated as "cases
in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact." Id. Additionally, the Court defined public rights cases as
those not involving "purely" private rights. "In cases which do involve ony 'private rights,' this
Court has accepted factfinding by an administrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only
as an adjunct to an Art. III court.
... Id. at 450 n.7 (emphasis added). The Court seems to
acknowledge the difficulty of defining in a "pure" sense what the "public rights" concept
encompasses.
25. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). Thus, in a statutory
proceeding the rights at issue are statutorily created and subject to the remedies provided by the
statute. In Tenneco, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the legislature, having created the
pooling order to implement its conservation statutes in the public interest, may also assign to the
Corporation Commission the adjudication of disputes arising from the same order. "Courts are
constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the Commission's exercise of its adjudicative
functions." 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482.
26. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)
("The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in
our precedents."). In the early case of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the question was
presented whether Congress could confer on a "non-Article III" court, in this case an administrative agency, jurisdiction to decide a "private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to
another." Id. at 51. It was argued that to grant this function to an administrative agency was
inconsistent with the grant of judicial power to article III courts, and that "the constitutional
courts may be deprived in all cases of the determination of facts upon evidence even though a
constitutional right may be involved." Id. at 60-61. The Court's conclusion was that "[t]here is no
requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges." Id. at 51. The Court cast the
agency into the mold of "adjunct" to the constitutional courts, which put the agency into a major
role of factfnder in the agency's area of expertise. Professor Jaffe explains the role of the court in
this scheme:
The essence rather of the judicial power is the control exercised by the court in testing
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gress may at its option confer judicial authority falling within the ambit
of article III upon either article I courts or legislative tribunals.2' Congress may delegate fact-finding powers to executive officers or to an
administrative agency as an adjunct to an article III court similar to a
jury or special master, but it may not confer a broad delegation of article III decision making power to non-article III tribunals.28
Congress' power to select remedies does not automatically confer
power to establish legislative tribunals with broad discretionary powers. 29 In the recent case, Northern Ppeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,3o the Court stressed that a matter of public rights

must at a minimum arise "between the government and others."'" On
the other hand, "Ip]rivate right disputes lie at the core of the historithe "reasonableness" of the findings of fact and in determining the law. One might reply
that fact finding is the crucial determinant of the overwhelming proportion of cases
[however,] . . fact finding by a judge is not a basic premise of our system of justice.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 89 (1965). See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW § 3-5 (1978) (general discussion of congressional power over
court jurisdiction).
27. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). In Palmore, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a reorganization of the District of Columbia court system, insofar
as the reorganization conferred jurisdiction in some criminal matters upon article I courts. Congress is thus permitted to establish non-article III tribunals in "specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment." Id. at 408. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court said:
At one time, this Court suggested a rigid distinction between those subjects that could be
considered only in Art. III courts and those that could be considered only in legislative
courts. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). But this suggested dichotomy
Our more recent cases clearly recognize that legislative
has not withstood analysis ....
courts may be granted jurisdiction over some cases and controversies to which the Art.
III judicial power might also be extended.
458 U.S. at 63 n.14 (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) and Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549-51 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.)).
28. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163, 170 (1943).
29. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). One
author states:
It is principally in connection with claims as to the finality of administrative action that
the question as to separation of powers becomes critical. So long as the legislature can
effectively change the agency's rules, and the courts can effectively correct errors made in
the adjudication of cases, it is of comparatively little concern that an agency's powers
possess at once legislative and judicial characteristics. Indeed, it could almost be called
an identifying characteristic of agencies that they combine the powers of rule making
and of adjudication. The mere existence of blended powers has not been a cause of
concern. It is only when the blending of functions creates a danger of unchecked power
that concern arises.
I F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 17 (footnote omitted).
30. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
31. Id. at 69. However, the Court also said that "the presence of the United States as a
proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing 'private
rights' from 'public rights.' And it is also clear that even with respect to matters that arguably fall
within the scope of the 'public rights' doctrine, the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts." Id.
at 69 n.23.
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and are defined as "the liability of

another." 33

one individual to
Adhering to this distinction, Congress
could avoid conferring article III court jurisdiction merely by altering
the party structure in a dispute, as by replacing the private plaintiff
with a government prosecutor.34 However, there are limits to classifying actions as disputes involving public rights, and the classification, no
doubt, must rest on specific statutory policy, "the enforcement of which
is committed to public authorities."3 - Thus, even a suit involving a
private right may be subject to decision making by an agency, provided
that a judicial court determines the law on appeal, and provided that
the matter is not one entitled to a jury trial at common law. 6
32. Id. at 70.
33. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). In Northern Pipeline the major issue was
whether the federal district court or the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction. 458 U.S. at 71.

Northern Pipeline Construction Company filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter I1 of
the Bankruptcy Act in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Northern subsequently filed a suit in
the Bankruptcy Court against Marathon Pipe Line Company seeking damages for an alleged
breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. The question of
whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction turned on whether the dispute was a "private
rights" or a "public rights" controversy. The Court held that the subject of the suit involved a
"private rights" controversy between Northern and Marathon, and that jurisdiction resided not in
the Bankruptcy Court, but in a federal district court. Id
ihe restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights,
such as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case. The former
may well be a "public right," but the latter obviously is not.
Id.
Both the appellees brief in support of petition for rehearing and an amici curiae brief filed in
support of the petition for rehearing in Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. B.J.
2476 (Oct. 19, 1982), used the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline to support their
argument that the controversy did not arise between Oklahoma and the parties to the action, but
rather was a controversy strictly involving private rights between Tenneco and El Paso. See Brief
in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 13-15, Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53
OKLA. B.J. 2476 (Oct. 19, 1982); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 1011, Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. B.J. 2476 (Oct. 19, 1982).
34. One author notes that "the National Labor Relations Board can constitutionally be given
power to order an employer to pay back wages to an employee whom he has discharged in violation of the statute." L. JAF supra note 26, at 90. By adjudicating the dispute in a Board proceeding, the right vindicated is not the employee's, but rather the public's. Id. (discussing
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940)).
35. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 90. In NorthernPpeline the Court found that the Bankruptcy
Courts established by Congress threatened to supplant the independence of the judicial system by
granting broad judicial power to non-article III bankruptcy judges. 458 U.S. at 73. However, the
Court recognized that it had previously sustained the use of administrative agencies and magistrates as adjuncts to Art. III courts. Id. at 77-79.
36. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 91; see, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (no seventh amendment right to jury trial in government initiated penalty proceeding paralleling common law private litigation remedies). The
Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) seemingly was prepared to allow administrative
adjudication of almost any issue so long as judicial review was retained and no other constitutional rights were infringed. See L. TRmE, supra note 26, at 43. Crowell involved the adjudication
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Thus, in creating public rights, Congress creates new causes of action and remedies, and places their enforcement in a tribunal which
will supply expert and quick resolution of the issues.37 Statutorily derived causes of action are cases where the government, in its sovereign
capacity, is wholly involved in enforcing public rights. "Wholly private
tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases,
are not at all implicated." 38 This is not to say, however, that private
a part of or involved in congressionally crefights are not inherently
39
ated public rights.
In many states the law is similar to that of the federal public rights
concept.' The same difficulty exists in drawing a distinction between
public and private rights to define agency jurisdiction. In one state, a
court held that an award of workmen's compensation was a judicial
function of a court by virtue of the fact that it involved a determination
of the rights and liabilities between individuals.4 ' Another state's court
held that the power to award reparations based on an unreasonable
rate must be given to a court because a determination of whether one
person was entitled to recover damages from another was involved.42
Such decisions demonstrate the inadequacy of the public rights doctrine for determining an agency's jurisdiction on an issue involving a
public or private right. Since many so-called "publicly created rights"
of congressionally-created rights. The Supreme Court, however, has sustained the use of adjunct
factfinders even in the adjudication of constitutional rights, as long as those adjuncts were subject
to sufficient control by an article III court. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
The Court stated: "Congress focused on the potential for Art. III constraints in permitting a
magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions. . . . The legislative history discloses that
Congress purposefully used the word determination rather than hearing,believing that Art. III was
satisfied if the ultimate adjudicatory determination was reserved to the [judicial process]." Id. at
676 (emphasis in original).
37. See Arias Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
461 (1977).
38. Id. at 458.
39. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943) (SEC
determined amounts owed to lawyers and managers in a reorganization); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (action to compel the payment of lost wages to an employee discharged in violation of a statute).
40. See Stehle v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 229 Ore. 543, 368 P.2d 386 (1962). See
generall, L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 94-98 (discussion of judicial power of state agencies).
41. See State v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, -, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1957). The court said that
"t]his is not to say that the legislature, in the exercise of its police powers, may not confer 'quasijudicial' power on administrative boards for the protection of the rights and interest of the public,"
but not "to a determination of rights and liabilities between individuals." Id.
42. State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 303 Mo. 212, 259 S.W. 445
(1924). In a suit for reparations for unreasonable freight charges the Missouri Public Service
Commission entered an order awarding the reparations. The Missouri Supreme Court held the
suit was a claim for damages which the Public Service Commission could not hear and determine.
Id. at 218, 259 S.W. at 447.
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inherently encompass private rights, applying the public rights doctrine
to individual cases may be difficult, if not impossible.
B. PrimaryJurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction is a court-created doctrine of judicial deference to an administrative agency to which a legislature has delegated
certain of its powers.43 Public rights inquiries usually arise when the
legislature has arguably overstepped its constitutional bounds in delegating powers to another entity. In contrast, questions of primary jurisdiction usually arise when the jurisdiction of an agency already rests on
a well-developed statutory policy and the court finds an accepted
mechanism exists for solving the issues.
The "outstanding feature" of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is "its flexibility permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of
business between themselves and the agencies."' The doctrine is "an
attempt to resolve both the procedural and substantive conflicts inevitably created when there is carved out for an agency an area of original
jurisdiction. . . of the courts. ' 45 The function of primary jurisdiction
is "to guide a court in determining whether the court should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in
the proceeding before the court. 46
The United States Supreme Court has offered one explanation for
primary jurisdiction: "The very purpose of providing either an exclusive or an initial and preliminary administrative determination is to
secure the administrative judgment either, in the one case, in substitution for judicial decision or, in the other, as foundation for or
perchance to make unnecessary later judicial proceedings. 47
43. F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 562-72.
44. See CAB v. Modem Air Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950) (citations
omitted).
45. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 121.
46. K. DAvis, ADMIiSTRATrvE LAW TExT § 19.01, at 373 (3d ed. 1972); see S. BREYER & R.
STEwART, ADMINISTRATlVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 992-1012 (1979) (discussion of primary jurisdiction).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction must be distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which is primarily concerned with the time and stage of the proceedings,
and is based upon the general principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted before
resorting to the courts. Primary jurisdiction is the principle which determines whether the court or

the agency should make the initial decision on the matter at issue. Further explanation of the
differentiation between the two doctrines may be found in L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 121; see S.
BREYER & R. STEWART, supra, at 960-92.
47. Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947). The Hirsch case
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The doctrine most often arises when a party has begun an action
in court and the court withholds relief because an issue might more
appropriately be decided by an administrative agency.4 8 In such a case
the court will usually retain the case on its own docket and refer the
party to the agency for initial determination. However, if the court decides that the agency's jurisdiction is not only primary, but also exclusive, it may remove the case from its own docket and refer it to the
agency for its sole determination.4 9

Primary jurisdiction situations often arise from the specific context
of statutory arrangements. "It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the
statutory purpose that a specialized administrative tribunal has been
created to deal with problems in a certain area; statutes setting up agencies may be assumed to focus the solution of the problem in terms of
the development of special competence." 5 0 The Supreme Court has
stated that in certain types of litigation, practical considerations compel

a division of functions between court and agency inthat the agency
makes a preliminary and comprehensive investigation of all the facts,
analyzes them, and applies the appropriate statutory scheme. 5 1 Thus,
primary jurisdiction is a device to prepare the way, if the litigation
involved an attempt to obtain on-the-merits judicial review of administrative action before the
administrative review was complete. The Supreme Court held that the district court could not
grant relief because Congress "clearly... intended the Tax Court's functions not only to be put
Id. at
...
in motion but to be fully performed, before judicial intervention should take place.
771.
48. See Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Needfor Better Court/Agency Interaction, 29
RUTGERS L. Rav. 867, 878-90 (1976) (discussion of appropriateness of judicial or agency action).
49. Id. Professor Botein breaks the doctrine of primary jurisdiction down into at least four
major individual doctrines, two of which are relevant here: exclusive jurisdiction and true primary jurisdiction. Under exclusive jurisdiction a court loses all power over a case except the
limited ability to review any agency action which ensues. Id. at 868-71; see Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). With true primary jurisdiction the agency has the
initial opportunity to consider a legal issue or to find facts, but the court reserves the ultimate
power to render judgment. Botien, supra note 48, at 868. True primary jurisdiction reflects the
idea of concurrent jurisdiction between agencies and courts. Id at 876-77; see General Am. Tank
Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940). Some scholars decline to categorize
primary jurisdiction in the manner Botein has. Instead they regard primary jurisdiction as essentially applying where exclusive jurisdiction rests with an agency, and they regard true primary
jurisdiction as only an aberration. Jaffe, PrimaryJurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REv.1037, 1054-59

(1964).
Primary jurisdiction is ordinarily pro tanto exclusive jurisdiction; insofar as the agency
has jurisdiction it excludes the courts. But a court, though not competent to decide one
of the issues, may still have jurisdiction over the cause of action to which decision of the
issue is relevant. The jurisdiction of the court will extend to the remaining issues and to
the relief to be granted.
L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 121.
50. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 124.
51. See Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958).
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should take a judicial course, for a more informed and accurate determination by the court of the scope and meaning of the underlying statute as applied to the particular issues at hand. 2
The development of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the
federal courts coincides with the development of the federal administrative agencies."3 As increased powers were delegated to agencies by
Congress, controversies calling for administrative discretion had to be
determined by administrative tribunals rather than courts. It follows
that certain questions are primarily within the jurisdiction of the administrative commission charged with that particular field of regulation. This is particularly true with regard to regulated industries.5 4
The degree of regulation of some industries is so broad and systematic
that it "tends to choke out the normal jurisdiction of the courts. '55
Since statutory purposes are seldom so explicit that it is possible to
determine in all situations where primary jurisdiction may lie, the
courts have created guidelines.5 6 Often the principal criterion in determining whether the doctrine is applicable is not legislative intent
as
expressed in a statute, but judicial appraisal of the need for deference
to an administrative agency.
One of the first major cases to address the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was Texas & Pac#Fc Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. ,57 in
which an oil company sued a railroad to recover rate charges it believed it had overpaid to the railroad. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the action could very well be maintained at common
law, held that a shipper was initially required to bring his claim for an
overcharge before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 8 The
Court rationalized its holding on the need for uniformity and equality
of rates. If the determination of fair rates were made by the courts
52. Id.
53. See Botein, supra note 48, at 868.
54. One authority states:
When no such pervasive regulation is provided for, as is the case with the Labor Board

and the Trade Commission, and when Congress has seen fit explicitly to confer concur-

rent jurisdiction on the courts as to practices within the agency's field, the courts generally have exercised that jurisdiction without prior recourse [to the agency].
L. JaFE,supra note 26, at 124 (footnote omitted).
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
57. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
58. Id at 448. The Interstate Commerce Act, while giving the ICC the power to hear a

shipper's claim that a particular rate was unreasonable, also provided that "[n]othing in this act

. . .shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies." Id. at 446.
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instead of the ICC, a uniform standard of rates would be impossible
unless all courts reached an identical conclusion.5 9 Thus, the Court's
opinion suggested that the Interstate Commerce Act abolished a preexisting common law remedy and created a new remedy that the ICC
0
would enforce.

6

While the Abilene opinion was very broad in its analysis of the
ICC's jurisdiction, it is not clear if the jurisdiction granted the ICC was
exclusive or primary. However, subsequent ICC cases have largely
limited the primary jurisdiction doctrine to questions of fact and questions which require agency expertise. 61 In the Abilene decision, the
Court was in all likelihood attempting to structure some broad stan62
dards to protect the newly formed ICC from judicial encroachment,
but out of these standards have emerged some basic rationales for applying primary jurisdiction.
The Court in Abilene addressed the need for uniformity and
equality of rates.63 Likewise, the Court in Far East Conference v.
United States' raised the issue of the necessity of uniformity and consistency in the regulation of businesses entrusted to agency regulation.65 Primary jurisdiction is a recognition of the need for orderly and
sensible coordination of the work of agencies and courts. Such coordination serves to reduce conflicting regulatory requirements and thereby
makes agencies more responsive to the problems they were created to
resolve.
59. See id. at 440-41. If left to court determination, the rate standard would fluctuate depending on the divergent conclusions reached by the various courts that would consider the subject as an original question.
60. See id. at 446.
61. See, e.g., Great N.R.R. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). The Court in
MerchantsElevator stated:
Preliminary resort to the Commission is required... [where] the enquiry is essentially
one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if
its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached
ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of
which acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable; and
such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a body of experts.
Id at 291. In United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), the Court stated that "[n]o
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves
will be aided by its application in the particular litigation." Id. at 64; see also K. DAVis, supra
note 46, at 375 (limitation of primary jurisdiction doctrine).
62. See Botein, supra note 48, at 879.
63. See 204 U.S. at 440-41.
64. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
65. See id. at 574-75. However, it has been said that questions of law may still be determined
in the first instance by courts and uniformity could be secured through review by the Supreme
Court. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 127.
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Another major justification for judicial deference is administrative

expertise. 66 This justification operates on the premise that agencies develop special expertise in their area of administration which judges are
unable to develop. The Court in FarEast Conference said that cases
raising issues of fact not within the realm of judges' experience or cases
requiring the discretion of the administrative agency should be left to
that agency's administrative process.67 This is so even though the facts,
after they have been appraised by the specialized competence of an
administrative agency, serve as a premise for judicially defined legal
consequences.
Primary jurisdiction is justifiable on the basis of the more expeditious action administrative agencies often afford, as well as the competency of agencies to fashion relief for broad classes.6 8 Underlying
many of these rationales for primary jurisdiction is the understanding
that whether an agency is expert or not, a court normally should not act
upon subject matter that is specifically, or even tangentially, within an
agency's area of regulation without first taking into consideration what
the agency has to offer in the resolution of the issues presented.69
Many of the states follow the federal rules of primary jurisdiction
when determining the jurisdiction of their administrative agencies.70
66. Professor Botein calls this a questionable justification for judicial deference. He writes
that agency members rarely are with an agency long enough to develop specialized knowledge,
that high level staffers are rarely competent, and that agencies really do not develop a fund of
knowledge and information that is sufficiently specialized to make the agency highly expert in its
delegated field. Botein, supra note 48, at 879.
67. See 342 U.S. at 574. In Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), the
Court stated that "in certain kinds of litigation practical considerations dictate a division of functions between court and agency under which the latter makes a preliminary, comprehensive investigation of all the facts, analyzes them, and applies to them the statutory scheme as it is
construed." Id. at 498.
Professor Jaffe writes that it is not the presence of agency expertise, but the pervasive and
systematic character of some agencies' regulation which tends to check the normal jurisdiction of
the courts. Jaffe, supra note 49, at 1040-41. Jaffe states: "Primary jurisdiction situations thus
arise, in each instance, in a specific context of statutory and, in some cases, common law arrangements and cannot be resolved by the single abstraction of administrative expertness." Id at 1041.
68. See Botein, supra note 48, at 880-83. Professor Botein says that "one of the traditional
reasons for creating agencies has been to expedite proceedings." Id at 880 (footnote omitted).
However, he also says that "any major adjudication is likely to proceed as torturously before an
agency as before a court." Id. Regarding competency to fashion broad relief, a complaint before
an agency may receive more adequate relief on the basis that the agency can frame its order to
develop future rules to govern similar situations, while the court is primarily concerned with past
conduct and is restricted to the facts of a particular case. Note, Primary Jurisdiction-Effect of
Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1938).
69. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
70. See Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 257 La. 207, 241 So. 2d 911 (1970);
Arnstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1963); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. White
Eagle Oil Co., 312 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1957); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 29, 344
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However, the state courts appear to more strictly adhere to the limita-

tions of its applicability.7 1 Thus, state courts frequently operate with a

greater amount of discretion in applying primary jurisdiction, and the

doctrine is not viewed as an inflexible mandate to resort to administrative agencies.72 Primary jurisdiction is generally applied when the
court believes that considerations of policy recommend the issue be left
to the administrative agency for initial determination.7 3 State courts
more frequently require the doctrine's usage when public utility com-

missions are involved in a controversy, probably because of the techni-

cal complexities often involved in such cases. 74 However, a major

principle remains that when an issue is inherently judicial, the court
should retain its jurisdiction unless exclusive jurisdiction has been specifically granted to an administrative agency.7 5
S.W.2d 411, 414 (1961); Public Utils. Bd. v. Central Power & Light, 587 S.W.2d 782, 787 (rex.
Civ. App. 1979); Kavanaugh v. Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 231 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950);
see also F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 563 (Cooper says state and federal courts are in agreement
that primary jurisdiction should apply when there is reason to take advantage of administrative
expertness and to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws.).
71. Cooper says that in federal courts the use of primary jurisdiction has outgrown the limitations suggested by the reasons originally given for its existence:
It has become a requirement of general applicability, enforced even in cases in which the
considerations that led to its announcement do not apply. It has been applied to issues of
jurisdictional fact, issues as to the unreasonableness of administrative regulations, and to
cases in which the administrative agency could give only part of the relief that plaintiff
sought. Such extensions of the rule have been criticized by Professor Louis Jaffe, who
suggested in a penetrating study: "The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a valid one so
far as necessary to avoid contradiction, confusion, and wastefulness. Beyond that, its use
should be sparing."
F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 564 (citations omitted) (quoting Jaffe, PrimaryJurisdictionReconsidered" The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577, 604 (1954)).
72. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 540, 95 A.2d 286, 288 (1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) ("[Where a constitutional issue is raised, and there is no danger of by-passing administrative action, the question may properly be decided in a suit for injunc." d); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex rel Transradio
tion or declaratory decree ..
Press Sere., 53 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1951). In a suit to compel a telephone company to install
teletypewriter service the Southern Bell court accepted initial jurisdiction and stated: "[While we
think [the suit] should have been brought before the Commission the question is here and squarely
presented, so we are disposing of it rather than imposing the burden on litigants of litigating the
cause in another forum." Id.
73. See, eg., Jacob Goodman & Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 309 N.Y. 258, 128 N.E.2d 406
(1955). In Jacob, the court declined to issue a declaratory judgment determining whether a telephone company was illegally charging a tax on tax-free calls. The court emphasized that the relief
sought by the plaintiff was so drastic that it would better serve the public interest if the public
service commission first considered the matter. Id at 266-67, 128 N.E.2d at 408-09.
74. See Marion Trucking Co. v. McDaniel Freight Lines, 231 Ind. 519, 108 N.E.2d 884
(1952); State ex rel.Taylor v. Nangle, 360 Mo. 122,227 S.W.2d 655 (1950); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Napoletano, 227 A.D. 441, 101 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1950); see also F. COOPER, supra note
8, at 566-68 ("The state courts frequently require prior resort to public utilities commissions,
evincing a belief that in this field there are involved technical and complex questions, and that
therefore the classic reasons for requiring prior resort are fulfilled." Id at 566-67).
75. See 5.E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs § 70.4, at 317 (1978).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION COMMISSION'S
AUTHORITY

A. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission
The framers of the Oklahoma Constitution believed in a strict separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. To the explicit prohibition of the mixture of powers they added the qualification

"properly."76 However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated with
reference to this exception that "[t]he makers of the Constitution recognized the difficulty in separating by hard and fast rule the functions of

the three branches of government."" The constitutional separation of
powers was qualified further by the statement that it should not apply
to those exceptions "provided in this Constitution.""8 A major excep-

tion was the establishment of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
with extensive powers over the rates, services, and public duties of
agencies of transportation and communication.7 9 In addition to

rulemaking and regulatory authority, the Commission was expressly
given "the powers and authority of a court of record." 0 Thus, because
it is an agency created by the Oklahoma Constitution, the Commission

is not governed by provisions of the constitution relating to the separation of powers. As a result, the Commission not only has power to

make legislative orders, but it has certain judicial powers including the
authority to adjudicate and to punish violations of its orders by citation
for contempt and by the levy of fines."' Additionally, the constitution
76. "[The Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments of government shall be separate
and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others,"
OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
77. State Bar v. McGhee, 148 Okla. 219, 225, 298 P. 580, 586 (1931).
78. OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
79. Id. art. IX, §§ 15-19, 25, 27-34.
80. Id. § 19.
81. Id. § 19; OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 2 (1981);see Williams v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 89
F.2d 416, 421 (10th Cir. 1937) (the Commission is defined as having legislative, executive and
judicial powers). See generally DeBois, PracticeandProcedureBefore the CorporationCommission
of the State of Oklahoma, 7 OKLA. L. RaV. 173 (1954) (discussion of jurisdiction and powers of
Corporation Commission).
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the powers of a state to delegate authority
among its three branches of government. In Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902), the Court
stated:
Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether
distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain
to another department of government, is for the determination of the State.
Id. at 84. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), the Court stated: "[Wihen
• . . a state constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is
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allows the Oklahoma Legislature to give the Commission new powers
within its constitutional
of rulemaking and adjudication in subjects
82
purview or in new areas of regulation.
The Oklahoma Legislature placed custody over enforcement of the
Oklahoma Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1933 in the Corporation
Commission83 "as part of an express public-law framework for the protection of public interest in natural resources."'84 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as being a legislative delegation
to the Commission to fashion the terms of pooling orders and to subsequently enforce them.85 Additionally, when disputes arise regarding
these legislatively created public rights, the Commission has the authority to adjudicate them, subject to review by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. 6
The Corporation Commission has only the jurisdiction and authority which is expressly or by necessary implication conferred on it
by the state constitution and by statute.87 However, the Commission's
authority is fairly far reaching 88 and its jurisdiction, while limited, does
extend to enforcing, interpreting, and clarifying its orders.8 9 Undenianothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned." Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
82. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 35; see, e.g., Croxton v. State, 186 Okla. 249, 97 P.2d 11 (1939)
(Corporation Commission could make adjustments of contributions to cost of well by owners of
interests included in drilling unit); Russell v. Walker, 160 Okla. 145, 15 P.2d 114 (1932) (regulation of oil production vested in Corporation Commission); see also Merrill, The Administrative
Law of Oklahoma, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 286, 289-90 (1951) (legislature is authorized to confer various
powers and duties on the Commission, and to amend or repeal sections of the constitution relating
to the Commission).
83. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 81-287.15 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The Corporation Commission's authority to force pooling of oil and gas interests in an established spacing unit derives from
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1983).
84. Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. B.J. 2476, 2481 (Oct. 19, 1982).
85. Id at 2481.
86. OKLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 20 (provides that "[n]o court of this State, except the Supreme
Court, shall... enjoin, reverse, or interfere with the Corporation Commission in the perform"); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 111 (1981).
ance of its official duties ..
87. Merritt v. Corporation Comm'n, 438 P.2d 495, 497 (Okla. 1968). The court said that the
"Corporation Commission is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and that it has only such jurisdiction and authority as is expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by the Constitution and statutes of this state." Id.
88. See Merrill, supra note 82, at 298-99.
89. See Constantin v. Martin, 216 F.2d 312, 317 (10th Cir. 1954) The court stated: "Martin
and others should have resorted first to the Commission for an administrative remedy, namely, an
interpretation, and ... a clarification of the provisions relating to allocation and disposition of
Unit production. Not having exhausted their administrative remedies, Martin and others are not
entitled to judicial relief." Id; see also Williams, Nature andEffect of Conservation Orders: Their
Finality,Modfication, Restriction on Productionand Consequencesof Violation-Duty ofLessees, 8
ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 433, 446 (1963). Williams states:
The practice of interpreting or clarifying its orders is quite prevalent with the Oklahoma
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bly, one method for strengthening the administrative order is to grant
the agency summary powers. 90 Granting such powers puts the agency

in a position to give its orders the proper effect, and is a reasonable
exercise of its police power. 91

In Tenneco, the court upheld the adjudicatory powers of the Corporation Commission by holding that the Commission, rather than the
district court, retains adjudicative authority over Commission orders. 92
Although couching its decision in terms of a vague federal constitutional distinction between private and public rights, 93 the court was ac-

tually laying the foundation for application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Under this doctrine relief must be sought in the adminis-

trative agency with cognizance over the issue before judicial relief may
be sought.
B. Administrative Jurisdictionin Oklahoma

Administrative jurisdiction in Oklahoma has been narrowly circumscribed. In CentralStates Power & Light Corp. v. Thompson,94 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Corporation Commission
could not determine whether a purchaser of natural gas was to be

charged under the industrial or domestic rate, even though the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission established the rates. The court

held that when a matter is of purely private concern between a public
utility and one of its patrons, the courts have jurisdiction over the conCorporation Commission. In some instances, the courts have withheld action in determining the rights of parties litigant under a conservation order until the parties could

apply to the Corporation Commission for an order clarifying such action. This is on the
ground that the Commission is best qualified to interpret its own orders.
Id. (footnote deleted).
90. See E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 153 (1928).
91. See Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 419,422 (Okla. 1975); see
also E. KuNTZ, supra note 75, at 314 (1978) (jurisdiction of state oil and gas regulatory
commissions).
92. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482.
93. This confusion is evident in the briefs submitted on petition for rehearing in Tenneco.
Both the appellee's brief in support of petition for rehearing and an amid curiae brief filed in
support for rehearing rely on a private rights argument in support of their thesis that the Corporation Commission should have no jurisdiction over an operating agreement. See Brief in Support
of Petition for Rehearing at 9-19, Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. B.J. 2476
(Oct. 19, 1982); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 2-13, Tenneco Oil
Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. BJ. 2476 (Oct. 19, 1982). Such a distinction between
private and public rights can raise countless similar arguments because it is a vague and often
imperceivable distinction. Rather, jurisdiction should be based on a clearcut statutory basis that
leads to judicial reliance on regulatory agencies when an issue is raised in their administrative
province.
94. 177 Okla. 310, 58 P.2d 868 (1936).
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troversy.95 This strict demarcation between public concerns and private disputes extends through a long line of Oklahoma cases, 96 with
one case even stating that a statute purporting to convey administrative

jurisdiction over a private matter is unconstitutional.97
The Central States Power decision has been criticized for dis-

rupting the uniformity of a rate structure by allowing controversies surrounding rates to be decided by courts lacking the expertise of an
administrative agency.98 A major problem with basing primary juris-

diction on a public/private interest distinction is that most problems
affected by primary jurisdiction have both public and private aspects. 99

Additionally, unwarranted emphasis on the private concerns, as opposed to the public interests, could diminish the effectiveness of administrative control in situations where the public interest may be affected

indirectly, but substantially."w The public/private interest distinction
95. Id at 312, 58 P.2d at 869.
96. Eg., Burmah Oil & Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 541 P.2d 834, 835 (Okla. 1975)
(While the Commission has general supervision over public utilities and common carriers, and a
power to prescribe rates, requirements, and other regulations affecting the services of public utilities and common carriers, it does not have jurisdiction to enforce a statute requiring a pipeline
company to connect a premises with a pipline.); Gibson v. Elmore City Tel. Co., 411 P.2d 551, 553
(Okla. 1966) ("The Corporation Commission has no jurisdiction over a controversy between two
private concerns."); Southwestern Light & Power Co. v. Elk City, 188 Okla. 540, 541-42, 111 P.2d
820, 821 (1940) ("While the Corporation Commission has complete authority and jurisdiction in
rate-making cases to fix utility rates, and in proper cases may order refund of excessive rate collections over the legal rate, there is no authority to construe contractual rights and to decree a right to
a reduction by contract ... and thereupon to render judgment for a refund calculated on such a
reduction."); Smith v. Corporation Comm'n, 101 Okla. 254, 256, 225 P. 708, 709 (1924). The
Smith court held with regard to the authority of the Commission: "Its jurisdiction is limited to
those controversies wherein the rights of a public utility and the patrons thereof are involved. It
has no power or jurisdiction to adjudicate differences between private litigants of purely private
matters between a utility and a citizen." Id
97. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. State, 268 P.2d 845, 851 (Okla. 1953). However, Professor
Merrill says that the constitutional theory of this case is vague and rests on the premise that the
Corporation Commission was created by the Oklahoma Constitution solely to enforce "public
duties." Merrill, Compulsory Unitizationand IndividualInterests: Judicialor AdministrativeJurisdiction?, 8 OKLA. L. RaV. 389, 405 n.85 (1955).
98. Note, supra note 68, at 1259.
99. While particular matters may be regulated by an administrative agency, private concerns
still lie at the core of the regulation. In Tenneco, because a pooling order had been entered by the
Corporation Commission, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the dispute came within the
public-interest purview of the Commission. Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2483. However, private
concerns were included and the claim brought to the district court was couched in terms of equity
and private rights.
100. Merrill, supra note 97, at 405. Professor Merrill expresses doubt that Central States
Power reflects the true doctrine in Oklahoma. "There is authority for the entertainment of a
private dispute by the Corporation Commission where public interests might be affected by the
outcome." Id. at 405-06 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carter, 93 Okla. 269, 220 P. 635
(1923)). In a more recent case, which expresses a broader perspective of the Commission's jurisdiction, the court stated that the "Commission exercises legislative, judicial and executive powers
limited only by the Constitution and Statutes." Continental Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 590 P.2d 667, 668

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 3, Art. 6
TULSA LAW/J URATAL

[Vol. 19:465

has also been criticized because it may unfairly confer jurisdiction in
favor of the agency "by an unwarranted disposition to treat administrative actions . . . as manifestations of some abstract 'public interest'
quite divorced from private claims and pressure. 01 Agency and court
10 2
may be equally representative of public policy.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again raised the public interest/private rights dichotomy in Southern Union Production Co. v. Corporation Commission.103 The court held that the Corporation
Commission could not construe or interpret an order it had entered,
unless the act of interpretation constituted the exercise of a power entrusted to the Commission by statute.1°4 Southern Union concerned a
Commission order that purported to interpret the legal effect of a previous pooling order. Under the first pooling order, Eason Oil Company
elected to accept bonus monies from Southern Union rather than join
in the drilling of a well in the unit. Although Southern Union drilled
and abandoned a well that did not produce, Eason continued to make
delay rental payments under the leases. 0 5 Eason regarded Southern
Union's rights under the terms of the pooling order to have terminated,
and filed an application with the Commission to have the previous
spacing unit deleted. Southern Union disputed the loss of its rights
under the pooling order, and Eason subsequently requested the Commission to interpret the order and determine the remaining interests.
The Commission complied with the request and entered an order interpreting its pooling order in a manner consistent with Eason's position.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Commission did not have
jurisdiction to issue such an interpretation. The court construed the
dispute as involving private rights over which the Commission had no
jurisdiction."
(Okla. 1979). In a special concurrence, Justice Opala said that the state constitution reposes in the
Commission "exclusive originaljurisdiction overrate-making. .

.

. This conclusion, which appears

on its face somewhat unreasonable and overly restrictive (in that it deprives consumers of access
to the ordinary courts. . .), is essential to preserve inviolate the commission's constitutional responsibility to protect the rate-paying public as a whole." Id. at 669-70 (emphasis in original).
101. Jaffe, supra note 49, at 1041.
102. Id.
103. 465 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1970). A critique of this case may be found in Hart, Interpreting
Corporation Commission Orders--Shouldthe Commission be a Spectator or a Player?, 48 OKLA.

B.J. 1343 (1977).
104. 465 P.2d at 458.
105. Id. at 456-57.
106. Id. at 458. The court stated:

We are unable to see where such an order is properly within the statutory power of the
Commission "to prevent or to assist in preventing the various types of waste of oil or gas
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However, in Cabot Carbon Co. v. Phillos Petroleum Co., ° 7 the

court clearly recognized the power of the Commission to clarify its previous orders without encroaching on the exclusive province of the

courts.'

The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently distinguished Cabot

Carbon and Southern Union by noting that the Commission's order in

Southern Union represented the Commission's opinion as to the legal
effect upon Southern Union's rights when that company drilled its test
well and subsequently plugged it.'0 9 The court said since such an order

was not expressly or impliedly authorized by either the Oklahoma
Constitution or statute, it was beyond the power of the Commission to

enter." 0 However, the court appears to be stretching the facts in concluding the Commission's order adjudicates private issue of title. If an
interpretive or clarifying order does not disturb rights vested by a prior
order, there would appear to be no encroachment on the province of
prohibited by statute, or any of said wastes, or to protect or assist in protecting the correlalive rights of interested parties .... " [OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(a) (1961)] as
amended effective June 3, 1963. It is expressly stated in the order appealed from...
that it is "limited to the interpretation of the pooling order and has no effect upon the
spacing orders under which such pooling order was entered." In other words, the only
effect" of [the order] was to find that as between Eason Oil Company and Southern
Union Production Company, the latter had no more rights in the horizons involved than
it had before the Commission entered its first order ....
Id. at 457. Following citation of authority saying the Corporation Commission is a tribunal of
limited jurisdiction, the court held:
We think, from even a casual reading of the Commission's [order], that it represents
that body's option [sic] as to the legal effect upon the rights of Southern Union of that
company's acts when it drilled its well into and tested the affected horizons and then
subsequently plugged the well as a dry or an unprofitable well. While such an order
could perhaps be valid if it was necessarily incident to the exercise of the statutory powers of the Corporation Commission to "prevent or assist in preventing (waste)," or, to
protect the correlative rights of interested parties in a common source of oil and/or gas,
such was not the intended, nor was it in fact, the effect of the [order].
Id. at 458.
107. 287 P.2d 675 (Okla. 1955).
108. Id. at 679. The appeal from a Commission order concerned whether gas taken from the
Guymon-Hugoton Field should be paid for at the price specified in the parties' contract or at a
price fixed by the Commission. Phillips Petroleum Company filed an application with the Commission for an order clarifying its previous orders, which had set the gas prices, and for an order in
respect to overriding royalty payments which by private contract were payable at a fixed rate. Id.
at 677. The Commission entered an order stating that the producer was not required to pay any
royalty or overriding royalty in a sum in excess of that required in its contract. The Commission
said its previous orders were intended to be interpreted and applied as a regulation of the production of gas from the field, by requiring that the producer realize a prescribed minimum price for
the gas and that the royalty or overriding royalty owners be entitled to payment based on the
minimum price the producer was required to realize. Id. Thus, the order appealed from was a
clarification of previous orders. The court stated: "Nor can the Commission's power to clarify its
previous orders be doubted under the specific wording of [OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 112 (1951)]. This
power, as has been done in this case, can be exercised without invading the exclusive province of
the Courts." Id. at 679.
109. Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, 655 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1983).
110. Id.; see Southern Union, 465 P.2d at 458.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 3, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURAAL

[Vol. 19:465

the courts."'
To further complicate matters, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently issued an interpretation of the Commission's powers' 12 that was
contrary to the interpretation in Southern Union. In Amarex, Inc. v.
Baker,113 the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that when determining
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, one is not necessarily limited by the express intent of the enabling statute." 4 Rather, "[p]owers
may be implied as reasonably and necessarily incident to those expressly granted, and. . . where the Legislature gives power to a public
body to do anything of a public character, the Legislature means also,
to give.., all rights, without which the power would become wholly
unavailable.
... I,,5 InAmarex, the court held that the jurisdictional
powers vested in the Commission 116 carry those implied powers neces-

sary to review and determine the Commission's true intent as expressed
7
in its orders issued within its legislatively prescribed powers."
111. In the Southern Union decision three members of the court dissented and one, Justice
Berry, wrote a dissenting opinion. 465 P.2d at 459. Justice Berry felt that the fact that the original
order constituted a proper exercise of a power entrusted to the Commission by statute was sufficient. The later order, being an interpretation or clarifying order, did not need to be shown to
constitute a proper exercise of the Commission's statutory power. Justice Berry stated: "Our basic
concern is only whether interpretation or clarification of a prior, unappealed order involves adjudication of vested property rights of individuals." Id If the interpretive or clarifying order does
not have the effect of disturbing rights vested by the prior order, then there is no invasion by the
Commission of the province of the courts in entering the second order. Id. at 460 (citing Cabot
Carbon Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 287 P.2d 675 (Okla. 1955)).
Philip Hart submits that the Commission's order in Southern Union was an exercise by the
Commission of its statutory power to protect correlative rights of interested parties pursuant to
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1983). Hart, supra note 103, at 1346.
112. See Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, 655 P.2d 1040 (Okla. 1983).
113. Id
114. Id. at 1045.
115. Id (quoting Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P.2d 1013 (1943)).
116. The jurisdictional powers are vested in the Commission by OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e)
(Supp. 1983).
117. Amarex, 655 P.2d at 1045. "IThe jurisdictional powers vested in the Commission under
§ 87.1(e) to determine development costs carries with it those implied powers which are necessary
to review and determine the true intent of the Commission.
... Id. InAmarex the Commission had been asked to determine additional developmental costs under a pooling order due to
loss of a hole after the surface casing broke off in the borehold. Other participating interests
owners refused to carry these additional costs. The Commission dismissed the case stating:
"(a) the application is an impermissible collateral attack on a prior Commission Order, prohibited
by [OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 111 (1981)]; (b) the Commission cannot interpret or construe its own
orders; and (c) the first Order. . . . 'on its face provides specifically for one well and does not, as
many Commission orders do, provide for the drilling of any additional, replacement, or twin
well."' Id. at 1042. The petitioner then applied to the Oklahoma Supreme Court to assume
original jurisdiction and petitioned for writ of mandamus authorizing the Corporation Commission to accept jurisdiction of the cause. The court reversed the order and remanded the case to the
Commission, "[s]ince the determination of development costs is a matter of continuing jurisdiction
of the Commission... " Id. at 1046.
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Interestingly, the court in Amarex cited dictum from another recent case, Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v. Corporation Commission,' ' stating that if a dispute arises as to the reasonableness of

expenditures in the event of a cost overrun under a pooling order, the
Commission retains "primary jurisdiction to adjudicate finally the liability attachable to the interest holders.""' 9 Thus, the court appears to
be recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission over such
disputes. However, the rationale of CrestResources is inconsistent with
that of Southern Union because in Southern Union a private dispute

arising from a pooling order was found to involve private rights and
was thus not within the purview of the Commission. In Crest Resources, the dispute involved a private contract dispute arising from a
pooling order, but the court affirmed the 20Commission's decision without the jurisdictional issue being raised.1
V.

CRITICISM OF TENNECO

In Tenneco a private contract dispute arising from a pooling order
was held to be within the jurisdictional purview of the Commission. 2 '
In fact, the court stated that whether or when the rights of the parties
under the pooling order vested is a matter distinctly within the determination of the Commission. 122 "It lies within its statutory mandate to
'protect correlative rights' and within its public-law jurisdiction over its
own orders."'"
Thus, since the Southern Union decision the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's view of the Corporation Commission's ju118. 617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980).
119. Amarex, 655 P.2d at 1043 (citing Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215, 218 (Okla. 1980). In Kirkman, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n & Funk
Exploration Inc., 676 P.2d 283 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed a
Commission order that stated the Commission has no power to determine whether or not decisions made by a pooled unit operator were reasonable. The court stated: "A finding that the
Commission has power to adjudicate whether costs are both required and reasonable would be in
harmony with other case law. The Commission itself clearly recognizes this power when it adjudicates the proper rates for public utilities." Id. at 287.
120. Crest Resources, 617 P.2d at 218. In Crest Resources, the court prohibited a collateral
attack on a Commission pooling order. The Commission refused to vacate its prior pooling order,
and refused to decide an alternative plea for modification of the pooling order. The court affirmed
the Commission's decision and held that absent a vitiating infirmity, a pooling order is resjudca/a. Id. at 218. The court held that once a unit operator's status is created by the Commission,
the operator cannot pass that status to a third party via a private contract. Terms of a Commission
order stand shielded from judicial assumption of authority over a private contract altering those
terms. Id. at 217.
121. Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 53 OKLA. B.J. 2476, 2483 (Oct. 19, 1982).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 419 (Okla.
1975)).
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risdiction seems to have become one of broad judicial deference to that

administrative agency's adjudicative process.124 However, in Tenneco
the court's rationale still rests on the basis of the ambiguous publicprivate law distinction. 12 The court points out the confusion that often
arises among litigants when confronted with a "duality of jurisdiction"
between the district courts and the Commission.12 6 However, there is

no actual duality of jurisdiction. The court recently stated: "The
power of the district court over a decision of the Commission is strictly
confined to a facial examination by which to determine whether that
administrative agency was vested with jurisdiction to make the order." 2 7 Thus, the district courts have no authority to interpret or con-

strue pooling orders.
The court could have accomplished more in the Tenneco opinion

if it had heeded its own suggestion when it stated that "a more workable test should be fashioned for resolving the all-too-frequent jurisdic-

tional conflict between the cognizance of the Commission and that of
the district courts." 128 A more workable test could have been fashioned
from the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In formulating a decision,
124. In Tenneco, the court cites Philip Hart's article supra note 103, which strongly criticizes
the Southern Union decision. Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2483 n.3.
125. See 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482. The court stated: "In matters created by the Legislature and
assigned to the Commission's adjudicative authority, the lines of demarcation between the district
court and the Commission must be drawn along the public-law/private-law borderline." Id (emphasis in original).
126. Id "The zones of authority over matters saved to the special jurisdiction of the Commission and those which are within the general powers of the district court have become increasingly
blurred as the Legislature and the administrative agency developed new patterns of regulation
which were unknown at common law." Id.
In Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1979), a dispute did result in what can be called a
duality ofjurisdiction between the Commission and the district court. In an action between a unit
operator under a pooling order and a mineral owner who elected to participate in the unit, the
interest owner made payments for his share of costs until a dispute arose about the reasonableness
of the costs. The unit operator brought an action in district court for a money judgment, while the
interest owner filed an application with the Commission asking it to determine costs. Id. at 348.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the pooled mineral owner was entitled to a stay of district court proceedings until the Commission reached a decision on the owner's application. Id. at
350. The Commission has statutory authority to determine costs in the event of a dispute over
costs under a pooling order, but the district court has jurisdiction in an action to recover on an
open account. Id. at 348-49. There is a discussion of Stle in a recent Note, which takes the
position that the court could have used the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Note, Administrative
Law: PrimaryJurisdiction in Stipe v. Theus?, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 86 (1981). However, Stipe does
not concern primary jurisdiction, but rather involves a question of tribunal priority.
127. McDaniel v. Moyer, 662 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Okla. 1983). The court also stated: "Cognizance to interpret and construe pooling orders would permit the district court to exercise a significant aspect of the Commission's regulatory authority. It would place the court in charge of an
integral part of regulating the conservation and production of oil and gas." Id. at 312.
128. Tenneco, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 2482.
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court should have considered the two major
reasons for application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction generally
recognized in state courts: "to take full advantage of administrative
expertness, [and] to attain uniformity of application of regulatory
laws." 2 9 The power to regulate in the area of conservation of oil and
gas is within the Oklahoma Legislature's constitutional delegation of its
police powers to the Corporation Commission.130 In placing such powers in the Commission the legislature recognized the need for the development of special competence in a complex field of regulation.
Additionally, the efficiency of the administrative regulation of oil and
gas conservation rests on the ability to maintain uniformity in application of regulatory law. If private litigants try to supersede that law by
private arrangement they should not be allowed to bring a dispute arising from that arrangement in a district court which may view the issues
differently than the regulatory agency. There is a need for litigants to
have firm rules to follow in ascertaining the appropriate tribunal. The
Tenneco decision fails to provide such guidance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the Oklahoma Supreme Court can be commended for attempting to grant the Corporation Commission its constitutionally and
statutorily due jurisdiction, the decision in Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co. is a disappointment. There is a definite need to refine
the court's decisions concerning the jurisdictional reach of the Commission, but this opinion merely clouds the question. The public/private
distinction is problematic and does little to aid the litigant in determining the appropriate tribunal. The court needs to clarify its decision and
to lay specific guidelines for litigants and the courts. By constructing a
usable doctrine of primary jurisdiction for determining the Commission's jurisdictional reach, the court would be taking a positive step in
that direction.
Karin Johnson Chaofeld
129. F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 563.
130. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co., 205 Okla. 255, 258, 236 P.2d 970, 975
(1951) ("Laws for the conservation [and regulation] of oil and gas represent a valid exercise of the
police power of the State." Id); see Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 623 P.2d 613, 617 (Okla. 1981).
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